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Story by CAPT Wayne Hughes, Jr., Naval Postgraduate School 
Photos by J02 John H. Scott, Naval Postgraduate School 
Among the quieter changes underway in support of 
the CNO's initiative to improve fleet tactical proficiency 
have been plans to modify the operations analysis cur-
riculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). A pilot 
curriculum is being taught to the class that entered in 
October 1980 and will graduate in September 1982. 
For perspective, I should point out that the spawning 
ground of modern operations analysis was the aerial Bat-
tle of Britain in World War II. Physicists had teamed with 
other British scientists to get their rudimentary new ra-
dar system into active operation as an early warning and 
fighter control system against the Nazi bombing cam-
paign. It became evident that technological and oper-
ational considerations for the effective tactical employ-
ment of RAF fighter-intercepters were inextricably 
intertwined. The scientists who worked with the fighter 
command had given birth to the notion that scientific 
methods could be applied to combat. (This is the conven-
tional wisdom. I am prepared to defend the proposition that the 
work done in the Italian Revista Marittima around the turn of 
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the Century constitutes some of the best operations analysis ever 
done. See Fundamentals of Naval Tactics by Lt Romeo 
Bernotti, TN, translated and published by the US Naval Institute 
in 1912. Both the proposition and the tactics are irrelevant today. 
The noteworthy point is that the mathematical models in it were 
developed by naval officers. Besides, it's great fun to read the 
book. It will also lend weight to the argument that the maneuver-
ing board, which had then not yet been invented, was the single 
greatest advance ever made in tactical decision aids.) 
On this side of the Atlantic, at the end of World War 
II, the best known application of operations analysis was 
by the U.S. Navy's civilian scientist team who helped 
win the Battle of the Atlantic and became the Operations 
Evaluation Group (OEG). (The First Navy civilian scientist 
operations evaluation group was convened by the Secretary of the 
Navy in World War l and was headed by Thomas Alva Edison, 
4 Alan R. Washburn teaches a group of anti-
submarine warfare students a class in combat models and 
weapons effectiveness. 
the inventor of the electric light bulb, phonograph, etc. [See Sur-
face Warfare Magazine, March 1978, page 2, "Searching for 
Superior Tactics".]) It was their analysis, as they worked 
side-by-side with TENTH Fleet officers, that determined 
the size and shape of World War ll convoys and the 
stations and tactical employment of the convoy's surface 
and air escorts. The old "Bent Line Screens" to combat 
diesel submarines were their creations. 
The U.S. Navy had been quick to perceive the value of 
operations analysis and saw the need to continue to fos-
ter the capability. After World War II, the various 
subgroups of operations analysis were consolidated into 
the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) and subse-
quently made a part of the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA). 
By the late 1940's ADM Forrest P. Sherman, then CNO, 
asked RADM Ernest E. Herrman, the Superintendent of 
the Naval Postgraduate School, to establish a new oper-
ations-centered curriculum. ADM Sherman reasoned that 
we should hav a nucleus of future line officers who 
could employ th methods of operations analysis for fu-
ture combat. The result was the first course of instruction 
in the world to grant a masters degree in operations 
re arch . The first two officer graduated in 1953, fol-
lowed by four to even each year year during the rest of 
that decade. Over the years the NPS faculty has acquired 
a reputation as one of the three or four preeminent Oper-
.a. Writer's cramp is an occupational hazard at NPS. Hand-
writing legibility is just never the same after what seems an 
eternity of note-taking . 
.,. Long sweeping hallways and stairways are as much a 
part of NPS as text books and computer labs. 
c_August 1981 
ations Research Departments in the country. (We have an 
Operations Analysis Curriculum taught mainly, but not entirely 
by the Department of Operations Research. The difference be-
tween OA and OR is of interest only to purists.) 
Over the l 960's and '70's the OA curricular emphasis 
shifted to include more courses in systems analysis and 
planning, programming and budgeting, which was a nat-
ural consequence of the Navy's need to deal on an equal 
footing with the systems analysts whose thinking so per-
vaded the Department of Defense decision process in the 
McNamara years. 
More recently, when RADM Allen E. "Boot" Hill, then 
the Director, Tactical Readiness Division (OP 953) in the 
newly created Directorate of Naval Warfare (OP-095), 
asked the NPS how it could best support CNO's interest 
in tactical excellence and combat readiness, the answer 
was easy: the NPS would simply restore its traditional 
focus on tactical and operational applications. Although 
the NPS had always viewed operations analysis gradu-
ates to be well prepared for either operational tours, 
force planning decisions, or weapon procurement analy-
sis, it was pleasant to be able to respond to the renewed 
Navy emphasis with what was always thought of here at 
the NPS as the wellspring of the curriculum. 
The changes the NPS would like to make in the line 
officer curriculum are moderate and evolutionary. They 
are illustrated in Figure 1. Four new courses are indicated 
by shading: 
• Introduction to Tactical Analysis 
• Weapons Systems and Weapon Effects 
• Combat Models and Gaming 
• Laboratory in War Gaming 
Six other courses we expect to modify extensively are 
indicated by cross-hatching: 
• Basic Operations Analysis 
• Radiation Systems (the physics of radar and sonar) 
• Mathematical Economics 
• Systems Analysis Principles and Methods 
• Test and Evaluation 
• Campaign Analysis 
The electives provide more depth in a field of special 
student interest. Some examples of electives with a tacti-
cal flavor. 
• Tactical Design and Analysis 
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• Application of Search, Detection, and Localization 
Models to ASW 
• Operations Research Problems in Naval Warfare 
• Skilled Operator Performance 
• Reliability and Weapons System Effectiveness. 
Since the early 1960's a six-week (half-quarter length) 
"experience" tour has been a popular and essential part 
of the curriculum. Students apply their fledgling skills at 
a naval activity that presently does analysis. More often 
than not they are surprised to find out how much 
they've already learned during their first year, when it 
seemed that most of their time was spent learning the 
fundamentals of probability, calculus, and physics with 
little more to go on than a casual promise from the fac-
ulty that "you're going to need all of this stuff later." 
This tour is also a time for searching out a thesis topic, 
a form of collusion between student and host command, 
cheerfully endorsed by the OR Department, the object of 
which is to settle on some research that appeals to the 
student and for which the host command would other-
wise pay good research dollars-say $50,000 or more-to 
have done . 
The student thesis is a form of cruel and unusual temp-
tations. You will see in Fig. 1 that the OR Department 
has begrudgingly yielded up two course blocks of time.· 
In return the students inescapably find themselves com-
mitting two or three times as much effort. Try as they 
may to treat it casually, the thesis becomes an alluring 
but demanding obsession. When it's all over the typical 
reaction is: "I never want to go through that again-but I 
wouldn't have missed it for the world ." 
<II Physics professor William B. Zeleny attends to his class 
work . 
""CAPT Wayne Hughes-author, professor and curricular 
officer. 
Looking only at the surface line officer theses for 
which I personally have been the student adviser, here 
are some interesting examples, the utility of which is 
obvious: 
• LCDR Patricia Tracey, Search Priorities For A Target 
Probability Area. Sponsored by COMSECONDFLT StaH, 
this was a method programmed on a hand-held program-
mable calculator to assist in Harpoon missile targeting. 
Pat is now serving in the CNO's Systems Analysis Divi-
sion (OP-96). 
• LCDR Michael Hoert, An Analysis of Candidate Ship 
Classes As Potential Naval Reserve Trainers. Sponsored by the 
Chief of Naval Reserve, this thesis looked at the pro's 
and con's of different candidates for the next NRF ships. 
Mike is on duty in Washing ton. 
• LDCR William "Chip" Boyd. An Analysis of the Passive 
Acoustic Detection of Hostile Submarines by Carrier Battle 
Groups. Sponsored by OP-96, this thesis applied the Dan-
iel H . Wagner Associates SCREEN model to develop sta-
tioning procedures for surface, submarine, and ASW air-
craft protection of an on-station, two-carrier battle group. 
Chip is now XO of USS Thomas C. Hart (FF 1092). (LCDR 
Tracey and LCDR Boyd were each bestowed the CNO Award for 
Excellence in Operations Research in their graduating class.) 
I do not intend to elaborate on all the new courses but 
a few observations are in order. The Weapons Systems 
course will devote a good bit of time to nuclear weapons. 
The emphasis will be on effects and tactical employment. 
The two courses in War Gaming are planned to exploit a 
new war gaming laboratory here that became operational 
for classified gaming last January. I don't mean to imply 
"f' Professor Alan R. Washburn has been teaching at t he 
Naval Postgraduate School in the Operations Research De-
partment since 1970. 
that the faculty now puts more stock in gaming than is 
justified. Quite the opposite: a major purpose will be to 
expose the students to this tool so that they may contrast 
their hands-on experience with the pro's and con's of 
other forms of battle analysis. 
A more detailed examination of the new course titled 
Introduction to Tactical Analysis will be of particular interest 
to fleet sailors. Since it is designed to survey all aspects 
of tactical analysis, it is a series of vignettes selectively 
lifted from the entire curriculum, specifically, those por-
tions of the curriculum that deal with fleet problems. As 
you read the course description in the next paragraph, 
you will note the contrast between what we teach at NPS 
and what is taught at either the Naval War College or in 
the Fleet Tactical Schools, under COMTRALANT and 
COMTRAP AC. The difference is in the focus: the NPS 
aims for timelessness and the latter schools aim for time-
liness. NPS endeavors to teach the analytical principles 
that will endure. They focus on today's forces, threat and 
doctrine in order to be ready to fight tomorrow morning. 
They are preparing students for the billet they now fill 
or will hold tomorrow. NPS wants our graduates, who 
are L T's and LCDR's, to have the enduring skills and the 
analytical frame of mind that will serve them in good stead 
throughout an entire career, perhaps at once on a fleet 
staff, later in command of a ship, and eventually in com-
mand of a battle group. We are even so ambitious as to 
believe a CNO some day will be a graduate, or ought to 
be. Thus, some of our graduates might naturally be 
found on the War College faculty, or on the staff of 
CAPT Stu Landersman's or CAPT Don Cannell's Com-
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mand Tactical Training Courses (See "RADM "Boot" Hill 
Talks Tactical Training," Surface Warfare Magazine, Oct. 1980; 
and "A New Tack for Tacticians", Surface Warfare Magazine, 
Nov. 1980), thus making them contributors to those al-
ready fine courses. 
Now, then, here is the course content of the Tntroduc-
tion to Tactical Analysis. All of the following aims at fulfill-
ing one objective: to introduce students to tactical analy-
sis concepts, tools, and material they will receive in 
greater detail later in the curriculum. Through the fol-
lowing means, the course emphasizes ways to (1) deter-
mine, and (2) improve on the readiness and the perfor-
mance of weapons systems, singly and in combination. 
• Measuring Combat Capabilities of Weapon Systems: detec-
tion measurement; weapon effectiveness; mobility and 
maneuver; logistics, reliability, and maintainability; hu-
man factors and "vigilance", training, leadership, and be-
havior in combat; and environmental effects. 
• Predicting Combat Performance-introducing the oppo-
nent: elementary principles of search and screening; 
game and decision theory concepts (these are terms for 
narrowly defined analytical processes); one-on-one en-
gagement analyses; and theater nuclear weapons. 
• Methods of Tactical Analysis-directing multiple forces 
in battle: the Composite Warfare commander T ACNOTE 
(in addition, each student reports on a TACMEMO of his 
choice, emphasizing the analytical process that under-
girds it); descriptive combat models (such as Lanchester 
equations and Markov processes); and descriptive and 
prescriptive combat models, using AAW and ASW illus-
trations. 
• Organization for Fleet Analysis: the U.S. Navy TAC D&E 
structure, process and publications; the exercise design 
process. 
Planned but not yet developed are lessons on cover 
and deception; World War II and Vietnam field experi-
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• Professor Alan Washburn moves to express his thoughts 
on the board. 
'Y LT Steven Burich glances from his notes to the chalk 
board. The lieutenant came to NPS from NAS Jacksonville 
where he flew P-3 's. The combat models and weapons 
effectiveness class is part of his course of study in anti· 
submarine warfare. LT Burich said that he hopes to acquire 
" a better appreciation of the technical and environmental 
aspects of ASW" through his class. 
ence; OT&E and the weapons system testing process; and 
the Sovie t use of operations an alysis. 
Regarding the latter, the Soviets have published exten-
sively on operations analysis, and since Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine subscribes to the scientific approach (ironic as 
this may strike you) if it is "ideologically correct," they 
seem to be busily incorporating naiyti-cal (read "scien-
tific") methods directly in to their doctrine. 
In order to give a better appreciation of the threat and 
of Soviet Naval doctrine and C3 structure we invited 
CAPT Landersman to bring a part of his Tactical Training 
Group Staff up from San Diego to give a five-day abbre-
viated course. In addition to the threat size, they will 
A CAPT Wayne Hughes talks with LCDR Lee Dick about a 
possible thesis topic. 
IJo.A LCDR Maurice McNeil, LAMPS pilot and student, was 
quick to point out a simple error, "Professor, I've learned 
to catch mistakes like that, I make a lot of them." LCDR 
McNeil will report to HSL-33 in San Diego upon his gradua-
tion in October. The commander spent his second tour as 
an instructor at SWOSCOLCOM in the Department Heads 
curriculum. 
cover current U.S. Navy capabilities, C3, and current tac-
tics. This is an experiment. If it is as successful as we 
expect, with the generous acquiescence of the TACTRA-
GRU and COMTRAP AC, we will institutionalize the 
event on an annual or semi-annual basis. 
The course examinations are designed to test the stu-
dents' broader ability to think, write, and solve problems; 
not merely his ability to manipulate mathematics. I have 
included some sample exam questions to illustrate. 
Continued implementation of the curriculum changes 
could be threatened if teaching resources cannot be 
found. The auspicious changes that I've portended de-
pend crucially on one major contingency. RADM John J. 
Eke lund, the Superintendent, has committed the NPS to 
the program in principle. But, he says, "To make these 
changes work-to bring it all together-additional re-
sources are required. We have a premier faculty here, but 
to teach tactical analysis, we have got to supplement them 
with tacticians with warfare skills for curriculum and 
course development and execution. 
" I mean," he stresses, "naval officers with fleet experi-
ence, and they must be good. They must have the right 
blend of saltwater and an operations analysis back-
ground. Without at least two quality officers with these 
skills-and I would have preferred three-we are going 
to develop slowly and the final product will be less than 
what I want, less than what's achievable, and less than 
what the fleet needs." 
Toward that end, OP-01 has established a captain billet 
for the Chair of Tactical Analysis. I personally believe 
the first incumbent must create a standard of excellence 
comparable to the military chairs at M.I.T. or Princeton. 
However, the chair holder by himself is not enough. 
There is another reason why a sprinkling of additional 
fleet officers must, in the end, seed the faculty of the 
Navy's own extraordinary graduate university. I have fo-
cused attention on the operations research curriculum, 
but there are other recent changes that bode well for the 
fleet. Since 1973 four new curricula leading to Master's 
Degree have been started and are specifically aimed at 
improved fleet readiness. They are: 
• Antisubmarine Warfare (first graduates 1975) 
• Electronic Warfare (first graduates 1979) 
• Command, Control, and Communications (first grad-
uates 1979)-sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (C3I), this is an all-service curriculum 
• Air-Ocean Tactical Environment Support (established 
1980) 
These curricula were conceived for graduate line offi-
cers who will be able to use their education in the fleet. 
Each curriculum is a blend of operations analysis, sci-
ence, and engineering. Thus, graduates will be able to 
attack tactical, scientific, and technological problems. 
From a slightly different perspective, these curricula 
adapt the same philosophy that those pioneering scien-
tists who invented radar brought with them to the Battle 
of Britain : science, technology, and tactics all converge in 
modern combat, and the best solutions emerge when the 
three are treated as inseparable. 
I would be remiss if I did not stress that the Naval 
Postgraduate School curricula all respond to sponsor re-
quirements. When OP-953 prompted the changes that I 
have described, they were made in response to specific 
objectives. However, the operations analysis curriculum 
has. long been sponsored by the Systems Analysis Divi-
sion (OP-96), and his concurrence was also necessary. It 
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is gratifying to record RADM Leland S. Kollmorgen's 
(Director, Systems Analysis Division, OP-96) reaction 
when he was briefed here during the annual curriculum 
review. Warmly endorsing the school's evolutionary ap-
proach, his straightforward "Get started" was strongly 
encouraging. OP-095, whose role is now as curriculum 
"consultant", also agreed. 
In closing, a word about what operations analysts do. 
The notion is prevalent that they do operations analysis 
when they occupy their subspecialty billets. That is, of 
course, true. But additionally, operations analysts, as 
much or more than any other NPS graduates, use their 
education wherever they serve. Analysis is a way of 
thinking. Optimization is always desirable: having some 
tools with which to optimize is the rub. If I had my way 
I would discard the concept of "subspecialty billets" for 
operations analysts if for no other reason then to empha-
size that a good analyst is always using his education. 
In my opinion, operations analysis is the finest curricu-
lum in the world for seagoing line officers who covet the 
responsibilities of command, and would if they could, 
think tactics and prepare themselves for combat all day 
and all night. 
Well maybe not all night. .,£, 
Figure 1 PLANNED OPERATIONS ANALYSIS CURRICULUM 
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Requests for more information about the Operations Analy-
sis Curriculum and the other tactics-oriented curricula 
should be directed to the Office of Continuing Education. 
The appropriate mailing address is Superintendent (Code 
500), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93940 
(Phone: (AVN) 878-2558). The Continuing Education Office 
also distributes self-study courses from the first quarter of 
these curricula which may be taken for credit et the offi-
cer's current duty station. Enrollment forms and a descrip-
tion of the off-campus self-study program are available in 
the Catalogue of Self-Study Courses which is mailed annu-
ally to all ships and stations and Navy Campus for 
Achievements Offices. Requests for copies of the self-
study catalog and the NPS catalog should be addressed 
to the Office of Continuing Education at the above address 





















Introduction to Tactical Analysis (OA2601) 
Second Exam 
26 Feb 1980 
L A sonar located in the middle of a channel has a 50 % 
probability of detecting submarines that pass at any 
distance from it up to half the distance to either side of 
the channel, and no probability of detecting 
submarines beyond. 
Assume that submarines 
are only 1/ 2 as likely to 
k h - xM XM ta e a pat - 2- .::; x .::; 2 
as they are to follow a path 
x beyond the sonar's 
detection range. (This is 
not the same as saying 
half the submarines are 
subject to detection and 
half are not). 
I 
1, 
I . :.1 I maxunum I '1 
I detection 1 I range 1 
I 1 I 
I : I >' 
- xM x = 0 XM + xM -2- 2 
a. Sketch the lateral range curve p(x) for the 
sonar as a function of x. 
b . Write the mathematical expression for the 
lateral range curve. 
c. Sketch the probability density function f(x) of 
submarines as a function of x. 
d . Write the mathematical expression for the 
submarine density. 
e . What fraction of submarines is expected to be 
detected under the circumstances? 
2. If three sensors have the following probabilities of 









a . What is the probability that at least one will 
detect the target at (x,y) if each detects 
independently of the other? 
b . What is the joint probability of detection if 
there is perfect correlation between sensors? 
c . What is the probability that a cross fix may be 
obtained from at least two sensors, assuming 
each detects independently? 
3. Telewigits are believed to fail at a constant rate. A test 
of 200 telewigits had 100 failures in 500 hours. How 
many altogether can be expected to have survived after 
1000 additional hours? 
4. If the payoffs for actions Al, A2, and A3 are as shown, 
for what range of values of 0 .::; P .::; 1 would you 




States of Nature 
Sl S2 
P 1-P 
$20 - $2 
- $4 $60 
$15 - $3 
5. Which (one or more) of the following statements 
regarding Game Theory is true? 
a. Game Theory is a conservative approach to 
decision making. 
b. Game Theory invokes a strategy suitable for 
the superior force. 
c . It is not always necessary for the value of the 
game to be positive to win if there is a saddle 
point and you play the optimal strategy. 
d . A mixed strategy for both players will be the 
game solution when the values of the minimax 
and maximin strategies are different. 
6. Blue and Red with 250 and 100 combat units 
respectively met in battle in which the Lanchester 
square law applied. Red unit effectiveness was 4 times 
as great as Blue's . 
a . After 30% of the Red units were casualties, the 
Red force broke and ran from the battlefield. 
While Blue was reconstituting and preparing to 
pursue Red, they were astonished to hear a Red 
broadcast claiming an impressive victory. 
What was the basis of the Red claim? 
b. In a fight to the finish, which side would win? 
c . Show the Red and Blue casualties in the two 
cases above. 
Answers to Exam Questions 
la. I.OJ 
P(x) .S 11----------------t 
- xw -2- 0 
lb . P(x) = .5 if x .::; Ix; I 
=0 if x > Ix; I 
le. 1.0 
f(x) .67 
Xw l J 
xw I 
I ...... --.- . . 
- xw - xw 0 Xw Xy -2- T 
ld. 2 if < < - xw f(x) = - - xw - x 2 3XM 
or XM - 2- < x .::; xy 
1 if - xw < < ___!!!__ = 3XM 2 _ ][ _ 2 
le. One-sixth 
2a. .66 b. .4 c. .21 
3. Twenty-five 
4. Choose strategy Al if P > .721 
Choose strategy A2 if P < .721 
Indifference between Al and A2 when P = .721 
Never choose strategy A3 
Sa. True b . True c. False d. True 
6a. When 30% of Red were casualties, Red had lost only 
2/3 as many units as Blue 
b . But Blue will win a fight to the finish and have 150 
surviving units 
c . When Red has lost 30%, Red casualties= 30 
Blue casualties = 45 
In a fight to the finish Red casualties = 100 
Blue casualties = 100 
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